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I. INTRODUCTION
In State v. Mata,' the Nebraska Supreme Court held that death by
electrocution violates the Nebraska Constitution's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, effectively overruling an established
line of Nebraska precedent upholding electrocution as a constitutional
means of execution. 2 At the time of the Court's decision, Nebraska
had the dubious distinction of being the only state in the union using
electrocution as the state's sole method of execution. 3 Now, in the af-
termath of Mata, Nebraska finds itself in a curious position: capital
punishment is statutorily4 and constitutionally5 permissible in the
state of Nebraska, but there is currently no available method of
execution. 6
In rejecting electrocution as a method of execution, the Court gave
considerable attention to the issue of subjective intent in Eighth
Amendment method-of-execution challenges.7 The crux of the issue is
whether an inmate challenging a particular method of execution must
show that the government officials enacting the method-of-execution
statute-or the officials carrying out the execution-acted with the in-
1. 275 Neb. 1, 745 N.W.2d 229 (2008).
2. See State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb. 432, 604 N.W.2d 169 (2000); State v. Ryan, 248
Neb. 405, 534 N.W.2d 766 (1995); State v. Alvarez, 182 Neb. 358, 154 N.W.2d 746
(1967).
3. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2532 (Cum. Supp. 2006). The electric chair was intro-
duced in the late 19th century and enjoyed significant popularity until the intro-
duction of lethal injection. Use of the electric chair as a method of execution has
been in steady decline ever since. Currently, only a few states authorize execu-
tion by electrocution, and in each case electrocution is one of multiple options.
See ALA. CODE §§ 15-18-82-82.1 (Supp. 2007); FLA. STAT. § 922.105 (2006); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 24-3-530 (2007); VA. CODE ANN. § 53.1-234 (Lexis Supp. 2007).
4. See NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 28-303, 28-105, and 29-2519 (Cum. Supp. 2006).
5. Mata, 275 Neb. at 31, 745 N.W.2d at 255-56 ("[Tlhe death penalty, when properly
imposed by a state, does not violate either the eighth or [the] fourteenth amend-
ment [to] the United States Constitution or Neb. Const., art. [I], § 9.") (quoting
State v. Anderson and Hochstein, 207 Neb. 51, 71-72, 296 N.W.2d 440, 453
(1980).
6. In January 2009, the Nebraska Unicameral Legislature responded to the Court's
ruling in Mata by introducing LB 36, a bill which would authorize lethal injection
as the sole method of execution in the state of Nebraska. On May 28, 2009, LB 36
passed by a relatively wide margin (34-12) and Governor Dave Heineman signed
the bill into law. The bill goes into effect on September 1, 2009. See JoAnne
Young, Nebraska Governor Signs Lethal-Injection Bill, LINCOLN JOURNAL STAR,
May 28, 2009.
7. Mata, 275 Neb. at 45-46, 745 N.W.2d at 265.
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tent to cause unnecessary pain and suffering. The Court ultimately
concluded that a successful Eighth Amendment method-of-execution
challenge does not require a showing of subjective intent.8 This find-
ing, however, is inconsistent with the U.S. Supreme Court's method-
of-execution jurisprudence. Furthermore, the Court's holding raises
concerns about the propriety of rejecting a crucial component of U.S.
constitutional and criminal law. This Note addresses the implications
of the Court's rejection of a subjective intent requirement in method-
of-execution claims.
Part II discusses the existing U.S. Supreme Court and Nebraska
Supreme Court precedent addressing methods of execution generally
and electrocution specifically. The Note then gives an overview of the
Nebraska Supreme Court's decision in State v. Mata, explaining the
Court's reasoning and rationale. Part III analyzes the Court's deci-
sion, focusing on the Court's rejection of a subjective intent require-
ment in method-of-execution jurisprudence. Specifically, this Note
argues that the Court's rejection of a subjective intent requirement is
humane and well-meaning, but ultimately unsupported by U.S. Su-
preme Court method-of-execution jurisprudence. Further, the Court's
rejection of a subjective intent requirement was unnecessary, as the
Court could have found a subjective intent requirement and still
reached the same result.
II. BACKGROUND
In Mata, the Nebraska Supreme Court emphasized that the ques-
tion presented was whether death by electrocution violates the Ne-
braska Constitution, not whether death by electrocution violates the
U.S. Constitution. 9 However, the Court also noted that the state and
federal constitutional provisions prohibiting cruel and unusual pun-
ishment are coextensive and that "the Nebraska Constitution's cruel
and unusual punishment provision 'does not require more than does
the [Eighth Amendment to the] U.S. Constitution."lO Consequently,
the Court relied primarily on U.S. Supreme Court decisions in deter-
mining whether electrocution violates the Nebraska Constitution."1
Because the Nebraska and federal cruel and unusual punishment pro-
visions are coterminous, and because the Nebraska Supreme Court
8. Id. at 47, 745 N.W.2d at 266.
9. Mata, 275 Neb. at 33, 745 N.W.2d at 257 ("[We conclude that the Nebraska Con-
stitution governs this issue.").
10. Id. at 34, 745 N.W. at 257 (alteration in original) (quoting State v. Hurbenca, 266
Neb. 853, 862, 669 N.W.2d 668, 675 (2003)).
11. In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Heavican argues that the majority's reli-
ance on federal precedence renders the Court's decision susceptible to review by
the U.S. Supreme Court. See Mata, 275 Neb. at 73-74, 745 N.W.2d at 282-83.
This is an interesting and debatable issue, but one that falls outside the scope of
this Note. Accordingly, this Note does not address it.
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relied heavily on federal jurisprudence in its analysis, it is necessary
to understand both federal and Nebraska death penalty jurisprudence
to adequately analyze the Court's decision. Accordingly, before dis-
cussing State v. Mata, this Note first provides a brief overview of U.S.
Supreme Court and Nebraska Supreme Court method-of-execution
jurisprudence.
A. U.S. Supreme Court Method-of-Execution Jurisprudence
Over the years, the U.S. Supreme Court's death penalty jurispru-
dence has been prodigious, addressing a wide variety of issues, rang-
ing from how criminals may be selected for execution12 to which
crimes merit the punishment of death. 13 Notably, however, the Court
has seldom addressed the constitutionality of specific methods of exe-
cution. Indeed, as one prominent legal scholar observed, "A striking
oddity of the American death penalty is the Court's complete constitu-
tional disregard for how inmates are executed." 14 The Court's
method-of-execution cases are few in number, and those dealing spe-
cifically with electrocution as a means of execution are even fewer.
The U.S. Supreme Court first ruled on the constitutionality of a
method of execution in Wilkerson v. Utah,15 in which the Court held
that death by firing squad does not violate the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment. In reaching its decision,
the Court drew on commentary by Blackstone, who noted that, at com-
mon law, criminals guilty of particularly atrocious crimes were not
merely executed. Rather, "circumstances of terror, pain, or disgrace
were sometimes superadded" to their punishment of death.16 It was
thought that death was insufficient punishment for those who com-
mitted the worst crimes-only torture would sufficiently punish such
criminals. The Court, citing Blackstone, gave examples of such meth-
ods of torture, citing cases "where the prisoner was drawn or dragged
to the place of execution . . .or where he was emboweled alive, be-
headed, and quartered" and where the prisoner was publicly dissected
12. See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153 (1976) (holding that states must require
guided discretion in selecting eligible criminals for death).
13. See, e.g., Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005) (the execution of a criminal
under 18 years of age violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002) (the execution
of a mentally retarded criminal violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment); Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977)
(executing a criminal for the rape of an adult woman violates the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment).
14. Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox
Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal Injection and What it Says About
Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 70 (2002).
15. 99 U.S. 130 (1878).
16. Id. at 135.
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or burned alive. 17 The Court admitted that the line between constitu-
tional and unconstitutional punishment is difficult to identify, but
noted that torture of the sort documented by Blackstone is clearly for-
bidden by the Constitution, and that death by firing squad cannot be
classed with the garish methods of execution enumerated by
Blackstone:
Difficulty would attend the effort to define with exactness the extent of the
constitutional provision which provides that cruel and unusual punishments
shall not be inflicted; but it is safe to affirm that punishments of torture, such
as those mentioned by [Blackstone], and all others in the same line of unnec-
essary cruelty, are forbidden by that emendment [sic] to the Constitution.
i 8
Thus, while the Court acknowledged the difficulty in identifying
the exact point at which a punishment becomes unconstitutional, the
Court did offer some helpful principles to guide future courts-
namely, that in order to constitute cruel and unusual punishment, a
punishment must involve torture of the magnitude described by
Blackstone, and must involve a method of death where "terror, pain
and disgrace" are deliberately incorporated into the method of execu-
tion. Through these principles, the Wilkerson Court established a
baseline method-of-execution standard that provided a foundation on
which subsequent courts would build.
Twelve years later, in 1890, the Court revisited the method-of-exe-
cution issue in In re Kemmler.19 This time the challenged method of
execution was electrocution, a newly invented and somewhat untested
method of execution. 20 The electric chair had been introduced by the
New York legislature as a method of execution to provide a more hu-
mane alternative to hanging.2 1 Nevertheless, the constitutionality of
death by electrocution was soon challenged and the U.S. Supreme
Court found an opportunity to address the issue in Kemmler. The
Court analyzed the constitutionality of death by electrocution not only
under the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, but also under the Privileges and Immunities Clause and
17. Id.
18. Id. at 135-36.
19. 136 U.S. 436 (1890).
20. Before the advent of the electric chair, the predominant method of execution was
hanging. In the latter half of the 19th century, objections were gradually raised
to hanging as a method of execution as it was increasingly perceived as a barba-
rous and inhumane means of execution. See STUART BANNER, THE DEATH PEN-
ALTY: AN AMERICAN HISTORY 169-77 (Harvard Univ. Press 2002).
21. In Kemmler, the Court quoted a statement by the governor of New York encour-
aging the state legislature to switch from hanging to the electric chair as a
method of execution. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 444 (1890). See also BANNER,
supra note 20, at 80 ("It was thought that, in contrast to hanging, electrocution
would effect a more human death-one that was 'fast, painless, certain, and
clean.'").
2009]
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the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.22 Building on
the Wilkerson standard, the Court in Kemmler explained the constitu-
tional meaning of "cruel," stating that "[plunishments are cruel when
they involve torture or a lingering death; but the punishment of death
is not cruel within the meaning of that word as used in the constitu-
tion. It implies there something inhuman and barbarous,- (sic)
something more than the mere extinguishment of life."23
The Court ultimately determined that death by electrocution does
not violate the Due Process Clause or the Privileges and Immunities
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 24 Complicating matters, how-
ever, is the often-overlooked fact that the Court in Kemmler never ac-
tually held that death by electrocution does not violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment.25
Rather, the Court held that the decision of a New York court was not
re-examinable by the U.S. Supreme Court because the Eighth Amend-
ment had not been incorporated against the states. 26 Even though the
Court ultimately decided the case under the Fourteenth Amendment,
the Court did address the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment, and in so doing articulated a method-
of-execution standard that has proven to have lasting utility and influ-
ence. Indeed, subsequent courts have frequently relied on Kemmler in
holding that death by electrocution does not violate the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. 27
After Kemmler, the Court did not review another method-of-execu-
tion case until 1947, when the Court decided Francis v. Resweber.2S
In Resweber, a death row inmate challenged the constitutionality of
the state of Louisiana's second attempt at executing him after the first
attempt had failed. The petitioner had been convicted of murder, sen-
tenced to death, and strapped into the electric chair, but due to a
mechanical failure the petitioner was not killed when the prison offi-
22. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 445-46.
23. Id. at 447.
24. Id. at 449 ("We cannot perceive that the state has thereby abridged the privileges
and immunities of the petitioner, or deprived him of due process of law.").
25. See Baze v. Rees, 128 S.Ct. 1520, 1568 (2008) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) ("Kem-
mler's actual holding was that the Eighth Amendment does not apply to the
states.").
26. Kemmler, 136 U.S. at 442 ("[T]he prohibition therein contained has no reference
to punishments inflicted in state courts for crimes against the state, but is ad-
dressed solely to the national government, and operates as a restriction on its
power."). The Eighth Amendment was eventually incorporated against the states
in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962).
27. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Dugger, 721 F.2d 719 (11th Cir. 1983) (relying on Kemmler
in holding that death by electrocution is constitutional); Spinkellink v. Wain-
wright, 578 F.2d 582 (5th Cir. 1978) (same).
28. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
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cial threw the switch. 29 In holding that executing the petitioner after
the failed attempt did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment,
the Court noted that the Eighth Amendment prohibition forbids the
wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain, 30 and that "[tihe cruelty
against which the Constitution protects a convicted man is cruelty in-
herent in the method of punishment, not the necessary suffering in-
volved in any method employed to extinguish life humanely."31 In a
footnote, the Court cited the standard set forth in Kemmler.3 2
Given the unique facts and circumstances of Resweber, the case ap-
pears to have limited application-seemingly applying only to those
rare cases in which a first attempt at execution is unsuccessful. How-
ever, Resweber is helpful inasmuch as it reiterates and reinforces the
previous method-of-execution standards articulated in Wilkerson and
Kemmler. Furthermore, like Kemmler, Resweber has been frequently
relied on by subsequent courts deciding Eighth Amendment claims.3 3
Taken together, Wilkerson, Kemmler, and Resweber-the only Su-
preme Court cases to have directly addressed the constitutionality of
methods of execution under the Eighth Amendment-provide the le-
gal standard for evaluating method-of-execution challenges. Running
through each of these cases is an emphasis on subjective intent. In
Kemmler, for example, the Court spent considerable time discussing
the origins of New York's method-of-execution statute, pointing out
that the statute had been enacted in order to provide a more humane,
less barbarous means of execution than hanging.3 4 In Wilkerson, the
Court was not as explicit in considering subjective intent, but the legal
standard articulated by the Court in Wilkerson prohibits the kind of
torture that almost by definition cannot be carried out without a mali-
cious subjective intent.35 Finally, in Resweber, the Court once again
explicitly addressed the issue of subjective intent. However, unlike
the Kemmler Court, the Court in Resweber did not consider the intent
of the legislature enacting a method-of-execution statute, but rather
29. Id. at 460.
30. Id. at 463.
31. Id. at 464.
32. Id. at 463 n.4.
33. See, e.g., Spinkellink v. Wainwright, 578 F.2d 582, 616 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing
Resweber in holding that execution by electrocution does not violate the Eighth
and Fourteenth Amendments); Williams v. Hopkins, 983 F. Supp. 891, 895 (D.
Neb. 1997) (relying on Resweber in holding that the need to apply electrical cur-
rent more than once in carrying out an authorized execution "does not violate
federal constitutional standards if there is 'no suggestion of malevolence'"); Ham-
blen v. Dugger, 748 F. Supp. 1498, 1503 (M.D. Fla. 1990) (same).
34. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 447 (1890).
35. Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 135 (1878) (stating that the Eighth Amendment's
prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment prohibits torturous punish-
ments in which, in addition to death itself, "other circumstances of terror, pain, or
disgrace... [are] superadded").
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the intent of the prison officials carrying out an execution. The Court
upheld the prisoner's execution, reasoning that there was "no purpose
to inflict unnecessary pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in the
proposed execution."36
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court has found death by electrocution
to be constitutional. Furthermore, the Court's analysis in the method-
of-execution line of cases suggests that a state-of-mind inquiry is rele-
vant to a method-of-execution challenge.
B. Nebraska Supreme Court Electrocution Jurisprudence
Before State v. Mata
Prior to Mata, the Nebraska Supreme Court, relying on the federal
precedent cited above, had likewise held death-by-electrocution consti-
tutional. In State v. Alvarez,37 a defendant convicted of murder and
sentenced to death challenged the constitutionality of the death pen-
alty generally, arguing that "the death penalty is a relic of an uncivi-
lized past, that it is now, in our modern society, a cruel and unusual
punishment, that it has no deterrent effect, that public opinion is op-
posed to it, and that the death penalty is not necessary."38 Although
the defendant did not specifically challenge electrocution as a method
of execution, the Court nevertheless took it upon itself to address the
issue, holding that electrocution "as punishment for crime is not a
cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the state and
federal Constitutions."3 9 The Court simply cited to Kemmler in sup-
port of its conclusion, presumably assuming that Kemmler foreclosed
any possibility of finding death by electrocution unconstitutional.
Consequently, the Court summarily rejected the defendant's argu-
ment without engaging in an extensive analysis of the issue. For the
Nebraska Supreme Court, Kemmler was dispositive.
Thus, Alvarez provided the state precedent on which subsequent
Nebraska decisions could rely in upholding electrocution as a means of
execution. In 1995, in State v. Ryan,40 the Nebraska Supreme Court
relied on Alvarez in reaffirming the constitutionality of electrocution
as a method of execution. In 2000, in its most recent method-of-execu-
tion decision prior to deciding Mata, the court relied on Ryan and re-
36. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464 (emphasis added).
37. 182 Neb. 358, 154 N.W.2d 746 (1967).
38. Id. at 366, 154 N.W.2d at 751.
39. Id., 154 N.W 2d at 751.
40. 248 Neb. 405, 534 N.W.2d 766 (1995) ("We have held that '[t]he death penalty by
electrocution as punishment for crime is not a cruel and unusual punishment
within the meaning of the state and federal Constitutions'.") (quoting State v.
Alvarez, 182 Neb. 358, 154 N.W.2d 746 (1967)). The Court also cited Harper v.
Grammer, 654 F. Supp 515 (1987), a Nebraska federal district court decision re-
jecting a constitutional challenge to electrocution as a method of execution.
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jected another electric chair challenge. 4 1 Again, the Court summarily
dismissed the defendant's challenge without engaging in a serious re-
view of the issue or an examination of objective evidence. Thus, as
recently as 2000, the Nebraska Supreme Court was still summarily
dismissing electric chair challenges. Eight years later, however, the
Court was finally willing to engage in a serious factual and legal ex-
amination of Nebraska's mandatory method of execution. State v.
Mata presented the Court with the opportunity to do so.
C. State v. Mata: The Nebraska Supreme Court Declares
Death by Electrocution Unconstitutional
1. Facts and Procedural Posture of State v. Mata
Raymond Mata, Jr. was convicted of the first-degree premeditated
murder of Adam Gomez, the three-year-old son of Mata's former girl-
friend.42 A three-judge panel, pursuant to Nebraska's sentencing
guidelines, found the existence of aggravating circumstances 4 3 and ac-
cordingly sentenced Mata to death.4 4 Mata appealed the decision and,
while the appeal was pending, the U.S. Supreme Court decided Ring
v. Arizona.4 5 In Ring, the Court held that aggravating circumstances
are the "functional equivalent" of elements of a crime and must there-
fore be determined by a jury.4 6 When the Nebraska Supreme Court
heard Mata's appeal, it upheld his conviction but vacated his death
sentence and remanded the case for resentencing by a jury in accor-
dance with the Ring holding.47 A jury then found the existence of ag-
gravating circumstances and Mata was resentenced to death.48 Mata
then appealed his sentence, arguing, among other things, that death
by electrocution violates the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment as found in the U.S. and the Nebraska Constitutions.
4 9
41. State v. Bjorklund, 258 Neb. 432, 489-90, 604 N.W.2d 169, 217 (2000) ("We have
previously held that the death penalty by electrocution as punishment for crime
is not cruel and unusual punishment within the meaning of the U.S. or Nebraska
Constitutions. We reaffirm our holding in State v. Ryan .. . and conclude this
assignment of error to be without merit.").
42. For a full account of the grisly details of Mata's crime, see State v. Mata (Mata ),
266 Neb. 668, 668 N.W.2d 448 (2003).
43. NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2522 (Cum. Supp. 2002) provides that a criminal convicted
of a capital crime may be sentenced to death if a three-judge panel finds the exis-
tence of one or more aggravating circumstances. In this case, the three-judge
panel found that Mata's crime was "especially heinous, atrocious, cruel, or mani-
fested exceptional depravity by ordinary standards of morality and intelligence."
NEB. REV. STAT. § 29-2523(1)(d) (Cum. Supp. 2002).
44. State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1, 6, 745 N.W.2d 229, 240 (2008).
45. 536 U.S. 584 (2002).
46. Mata 1, 266 Neb. at 476, 668 N.W.2d at 698 (quoting Ring, 536 U.S. at 609).
47. Mata, 275 Neb. at 6, 745 N.W.2d at 240.
48. Id. at 7, 745 N.W.2d at 240.
49. Id.
2009]
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2. The Nebraska Supreme Court Opinion
The Court began its analysis by clarifying the precise issue before
the court, emphasizing that the Court's analysis would not address
the constitutionality of the death penalty generally, but rather electro-
cution as a method of execution. 50 The Court then further clarified
that the Court was deciding the constitutionality of electrocution
under the state constitution, not the federal constitution.51 The Court
acknowledged that it had previously held that execution by electrocu-
tion does not violate the Eighth Amendment of either the state or fed-
eral constitutions, but rejected those decisions as having been made
without a factual review of objective evidence relating to the physio-
logical effects of electrocution on a human body.52 A review of a com-
plete factual record, the Court argued, compelled a result different
from that reached in its previous decisions. 5 3
Noting that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
contained in the Nebraska Constitution mirrors the federal Eighth
Amendment,54 the Court went on to liberally rely on federal precedent
in its analysis. 5 5 The Court gave an overview of Kemmler and
Resweber,56 emphasizing that those cases relied on the incorrect fac-
tual assumption "that when properly carried out, electrocution is an
instantaneous and painless method of inflicting death."57 The Court
then concluded that, in light of contemporary scientific evidence not
considered by the U.S. Supreme Court in deciding its early execution-
by-electrocution cases, it could "no longer rely on the factual assump-
tions implicit in U.S. Supreme Court precedent pertaining to the con-
stitutionality of execution by electrocution."58
While rejecting the factual assumptions underlying the U.S. Su-
preme Court's early method-of-execution jurisprudence, the Court
nevertheless relied on federal precedent in extracting three distinct
50. Id. at 31, 745 N.W.2d at 256 ("[Tjhe issue before us is not whether Mata will be
executed, but only whether the current statutory method of execution is
constitutional.).
51. Id. at 33, 745 N.W.2d at 257.
52. Id. at 38-39, 745 N.W.2d at 261.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 33-34, 745 N.W.2d at 257.
55. This is an odd but necessary move by the Court. It is odd because the Court has
already stated that the relevant issue is whether death by electrocution violates
the Nebraska Constitution, not whether it violates the federal Constitution. The
Court wants to have its cake and eat it too, by purporting to decide the issue
under the state constitution while relying on federal precedent. It is a necessary
move, however, given the fact that the two constitutions are in fact coterminous.
The Nebraska cases dealing with this issue simply cite to federal precedents, so
the Court has no alternative but to rely on federal precedent in its analysis.
56. See supra Part II.A.
57. Mata, 275 Neb. at 38, 745 N.W.2d at 260.
58. Id. at 39, 745 N.W.2d at 260.
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legal standards defining cruel and unusual punishment from U.S. Su-
preme Court jurisprudence. 59 Drawing on early U.S. Supreme Court
decisions such as Kemmler and Resweber, the Court noted that the
baseline standard for defining cruel and unusual punishment is
"whether it imposes torture or a lingering death that is unnecessary to
the mere extinguishment of life."60 Under this standard, a method of
execution must be nearly instantaneous and painless,6 1 and "must not
involve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."6 2
After articulating this baseline standard for defining cruel and un-
usual punishment, the Court stated a second standard for interpret-
ing the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment, observing that the U.S. Supreme Court has long held
that the "prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is not a
static concept and 'must draw its meaning from evolving standards of
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society."63 Evolving
standards of decency, the Court noted, are measured "in the light of
contemporary human knowledge."64 Furthermore, the Court observed
that the U.S. Supreme Court has frequently looked to laws enacted by
state legislatures in determining contemporary standards of de-
cency. 65 Rejecting the state's argument that the evolving-standards-
of-decency standard is only applicable to proportionality claims, 66 the
Court concluded that this standard is also applicable to method-of-ex-
ecution claims.67
Finally, the Court addressed a third Eighth Amendment standard,
pointing out that the Eighth Amendment requires that a method of
execution "must accord with the dignity of man which is the basic con-
cept underlying the prohibition against cruel and unusual punish-
ment."68 Relying on dissenting opinions from a U.S. Supreme Court
case and a Florida Supreme Court case, the Court argued that this
dignity-of-man standard demands not just (insofar as possible) instan-
taneous and painless executions, but also executions untainted by
59. Id. at 39, 745 N.W.2d at 261.
60. Id. at 40, 745 N.W.2d at 262 (citing In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436 (1890)).
61. Id. (citing Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 463 (1947)).
62. Id. (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
63. Id. at 41, 745 N.W.2d at 262 (quoting Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)).
64. Id. (quoting Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666 (1962)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
65. Id. at 41-42, 745 at 262-63.
66. The Court has commonly invoked the evolving-standards-of-decency analysis
when addressing "proportionality claims." Proportionality claims are those in
which the defendant argues that death is a disproportionate penalty for the crime
committed. See, e.g., Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (holding that a sen-
tence of death for the rape of an adult woman is a disproportionate penalty).
67. Mata, 275 Neb. at 43, 745 N.W.2d at 263.
68. Id. at 44, 745 N.W.2d at 264 (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 173 (1976)).
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bodily mutilation.6 9 The Court summarized this standard by stating
that "barbarous punishments . . . that mutilate the prisoner's body,"
even those that do not cause the prisoner pain, "do not comport with
the Eighth Amendment's dignity of man standard."
70
After discussing the different standards for measuring cruel and
unusual punishment, the Court then went into great detail respond-
ing to the state's argument that a prisoner, in order to prevail on an
Eighth Amendment cruel and unusual punishment claim, must be
able to "show that the Legislature intended to inflict unnecessary pain
or a lingering death" in enacting a statute authorizing a particular
method of execution. 7 1 In its discussion of subjective intent, the Court
rejected the notion that an Eighth Amendment violation requires a
showing of subjective intent on the part of a legislature enacting a
method-of-execution statute.72 Likewise, the Court rejected a subjec-
tive intent requirement on the part of prison officials either develop-
ing execution protocols or carrying out executions pursuant to a
method-of-execution statute .3
The Court based its rejection of a subjective intent requirement on
three separate lines of reasoning. First, it distinguished method-of-
execution claims from conditions-of-confinement claims (i.e., claims
brought by prison inmates alleging that the conditions of their con-
finement amount to cruel and unusual punishment).7 4 The Court ob-
served that federal courts disagree about whether a "deliberate
indifference" state-of-mind inquiry, which is commonly invoked in con-
ditions-of-confinement cases, is applicable to method-of-execution
cases.7 5 Noting that the Seventh Circuit 7 6 has held that a prisoner
challenging a method of execution must show "that prison officials
have been deliberately indifferent to [a risk of unnecessary pain] in
developing an execution protocol," 7 the Court rejected this position
and adopted instead the position espoused by the Eighth Circuit,
which held that a state-of-mind inquiry is relevant to condition-of-con-
finement claims, but irrelevant to method-of-execution claims. 7 8
69. Id. at 44-45, 745 N.W.2d at 264 (citing Glass v. Louisiana, 471 U.S. 1080, 1085
(1985) (Brennan, J., dissenting) and Provenzano v. Moore, 744 So. 2d 413, 428-29
(Fla. 1999) (Shaw, J., dissenting)).
70. Mata, 275 Neb. at 45, 745 N.W.2d at 264-65.
71. Id. at 45-46, 745 N.W.2d at 264-65.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 45-46, 745 N.W.2d at 265-66.
74. Id. at 45-46, 745 N.W.2d at 265.
75. Id.
76. See, e.g., Lambert v. Buss, 498 F.3d 446 (7th Cir. 2001) (requiring "deliberate
indifference" on the part of prison officials developing execution protocols).
77. Mata, 275 Neb. at 45, 745 N.W.2d at 265.
78. Id. (citing Taylor v. Crawford, 487 F.3d 1072 (8th Cir. 2007)).
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While acknowledging the existence of method-of-execution cases
requiring a showing of subjective intent,79 the Court distinguished
those cases by pointing out that such cases usually involve prison offi-
cials whose conduct was not authorized by statute. Relying on the
Eighth Circuit's reasoning, the Court argued that a state-of-mind in-
quiry is irrelevant whenever a prison official acts pursuant to a stat-
ute because a "prison official's subjective intent is presumptively
shown when the pain inflicted is formally meted out as punish-
ment."80 The Court pointed out that "[w]hen the official is carrying
out an official penalty [pursuant to a statute or sentencing judge],
there is no rationale for requiring the prisoner to show 'an additional
culpable mental state on behalf of any individual state actors."' 8 1
Second, the Court examined the meaning of the term "wanton" as
used in the context of the Eighth Amendment standard defining cruel
and unusual punishment as the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain."8 2 The Court reasoned that the term "wanton," which ordinarily
connotes a malevolent subjective intent, does not, in the context of the
"wanton and unnecessary infliction of pain" standard, imply any sort
of subjective intent. Rather, the Court reasoned, in the context of
death penalty jurisprudence, the term "wanton" simply "means that
the method [of execution] is inherently cruel."
8 3
Finally, the Court relied on two U.S. Supreme Court cases-Trop
v. Dulles8 4 and Francis v. Resweber 5 -in support of its argument that
a method-of-execution analysis does not include a consideration of
subjective intent.8 6 In Trop, the U.S. Supreme Court addressed the
constitutionality of a statute punishing war-time deserters with a loss
of citizenship, ultimately holding that such a stringent punishment
rose to the level of cruel and unusual.8 7 The Nebraska Supreme Court
noted that the U.S. Supreme Court in Trop was "unconcerned" with
whether Congress had intended to inflict cruel and unusual punish-
ment when it enacted the wartime desertion statute.8 8 The Nebraska
Supreme Court concluded that the U.S. Supreme Court's refusal to
consider legislative intent in its analysis was evidence that such an
analysis is irrelevant in method-of-execution claims. After discussing
79. For example, the Court cited to Lambert, 498 F.3d 446, a Seventh Circuit case in
which the court required "deliberate indifference" on the part of prison officials
developing execution protocols.
80. Mata, 275 Neb. at 46, 745 N.W.2d at 265 (citing Harbison v. Little, 511 F. Supp.
2d 872 (M.D. Tenn. 2007)).
81. Id. at 46, 745 N.W.2d at 265 (citing Harbison, 511 F. Supp. 2d at 894).
82. Id. at 46-47, 745 N.W.2d at 265.
83. Id. (citing Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)).
84. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
85. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
86. Mata, 275 Neb. at 46-47, 745 N.W.2d at 265.
87. Id. at 47, 745 N.W.2d at 266 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86 (1958)).
88. Id., 745 N.W.2d at 266.
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Trop, the Court cited Resweber,S9 in which the dissenting justices ar-
gued "that state officials' lack of intent to cause pain was
irrelevant."90
After discussing the issue of subjective intent in Eighth Amend-
ment standards defining cruel and unusual punishment, the Court
then went on to apply the standards to the facts of the case at bar,
ultimately concluding that electrocution does not comport with these
standards and thus violates the Eighth Amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment. In reaching that conclusion,
the Court did what it had not done in prior electric chair challenges: it
examined the factual record and considered contemporary scientific
evidence relating to the physiological effects of electrocution on the
human body. After examining the record, the Court agreed with the
district court's conclusion that current scientific evidence seriously
undermines the traditional assumption that electrocution results in a
nearly instantaneous and painless death.9 1 The district court noted
that "the State's theory of instantaneous death assumed a substantial
amount of current going to the brain, which was impossible to
know."9 2 Expert testimony established that the human skull is a poor
conductor of electricity and that consequently "only 5 to 10 percent of
the electric current, and possibly as little as 2 percent of the current,
would pass through the skull to the brain."93 The Court quoted the
district court's rejection of the notion that the electric chair causes in-
stantaneous death:
The proposition that judicial electrocutions always result in instantaneous
and irreversible brain death with the brain approaching a boiling point is a
myth. It is probably the case that some instances ofjudicial electrocutions do
result in instantaneous brain death. It is certainly true that all of them do
not.
9 4
In support of its finding that the electric chair does not result in
instantaneous death, the Court considered evidence that prison offi-
cials sometimes have to send a second current of electricity through an
inmate's body in order to carry out the execution. The Court heard
testimony from expert witnesses who testified that in some cases in-
mates "show[ed] signs of consciousness during an electrocution,"95
and that the heart was capable of restarting. 96
89. See supra section II.A.
90. Mata, 275 Neb. at 47, 745 N.W.2d at 266 (citing Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S.
459 (1947)).
91. Id. at 57, 745 N.W.2d at 272.
92. Id. at 55, 745 N.W.2d at 271.
93. Id. at 60, 745 N.W.2d at 274.
94. Id. at 56, 745 N.W.2d at 272.
95. Id. at 63-64, 745 N.W.2d at 275-76.
96. Id. at 58, 745 N.W.2d at 272-73.
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The inevitable consequence of the electric chair's failure to cause
instantaneous death, of course, is that a significant number of inmates
will experience agonizing pain. The Court observed that "a conscious
prisoner would suffer excruciating pain from the electrical burning
that is occurring in the body."97 Relying on expert testimony, the
Court found that a prisoner who is electrocuted "experiences extreme
pain and suffering from electrical stimulation of sensory nerves in the
skin and muscles."9 8
The Court concluded that "electrocution will unquestionably inflict
intolerable pain unnecessary to cause death in enough executions so
as to present a substantial risk that any prisoner will suffer unneces-
sary and wanton pain in a judicial execution by electrocution."99 In
light of this finding, the Court ultimately held that death by electrocu-
tion violates the Nebraska Constitution's prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. 0 0
III. ANALYSIS
A. Eighth Amendment Standards
One of the most perplexing tasks for any court sorting through the
U.S. Supreme Court's death penalty jurisprudence is making sense of
the various and somewhat nebulous Eighth Amendment standards ar-
ticulated by the Court over the years. The difficulty in making sense
of Eighth Amendment standards arises because the Eighth Amend-
ment has not been defined by a single, easily applicable standard, but
by various standards that have evolved gradually over the years as
the Court has struggled to give concrete meaning to the abstract pro-
hibition against "cruel and unusual punishment." In deciding Mata,
the Nebraska Supreme Court's first important analytic step was to
identify the appropriate standards defining cruel and unusual punish-
ment. Given the complexity of the U.S. Supreme Court's death pen-
alty jurisprudence, this was no small task. While the Court did an
admirable job articulating the three applicable standards-i.e. "evolv-
ing standards of decency," "dignity of man," and "unnecessary and
wanton infliction of pain"1O1-the Court arguably misinterpreted the
U.S. Supreme Court's method-of-execution jurisprudence by holding
that a subjective intent inquiry is irrelevant to a method-of-execution
challenge.
97. Id. at 64, 745 N.W.2d at 277.
98. Id. at 65, 745 N.W.2d at 277.
99. Id. at 66, 745 N.W.2d at 278.
100. Id. at 67-69, 745 N.W.2d at 278-80.
101. See supra subsection II.C.2.
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B. The Requirement of Subjective Intent
The U.S. Supreme Court's method-of-execution jurisprudence
raises the difficult question of whether the Eighth Amendment de-
mands a subjective intent requirement. It must initially be noted that
the subjective intent at issue is twofold: (1) the intent of the legisla-
ture passing a method-of-execution statute, and (2) the intent of
prison officials either designing a death penalty protocol or carrying
out an execution. A careful analysis of the U.S. Supreme Court's
method-of-execution jurisprudence suggests that a method-of-execu-
tion analysis requires a consideration of the intent of both legislatures
and prison officials. Nevertheless, the Nebraska Supreme Court con-
cluded that an Eighth Amendment violation does not require the pres-
ence of subjective intent.10 2 While this conclusion may be soundly
based on humane ideals, it is not based on U.S. Supreme Court juris-
prudence. In fact, in the few method-of-execution cases heard by the
U.S. Supreme Court, the Court has consistently considered the subjec-
tive intent of both prison officials 10 3 and legislatures.104
1. Critique of the Court's Subjective Intent Analysis
As noted in subsection II.C.2, the Court made several arguments in
support of its rejection of a subjective intent requirement. First, the
Court reasoned that the subjective intent standard employed in the
conditions-of-confinement line of cases is inapplicable to method-of-ex-
ecution cases.105 Second, the Court argued that the meaning of the
term "wanton"-as used in the context of Eighth Amendment death
penalty jurisprudence-does not connote a subjective state of mind.10 6
Finally, the Court argued that two U.S. Supreme Court cases-Trop v.
Dulles10 7 and ResweberlO8-support the proposition that a state-of-
mind inquiry is irrelevant to the analysis of a method-of-execution
claim. 109 This Note will analyze each of these arguments in turn.
a. Conditions-of-Confinement Claims Distinguished
In Mata, the Nebraska Supreme Court found that the mental state
of "deliberate indifference" required in prison-conditions claims is in-
applicable to method-of-execution claims.11o However, this finding is
undermined by the fact that the "deliberate indifference" standard
102. Mata, 275 Neb. at 45-48, 745 N.W.2d at 265-66.
103. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 464 (1947).
104. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443 (1890).
105. Mata, 275 Neb. at 45-46, 745 N.W.2d at 265.
106. Id. at 46-47, 745 N.W.2d at 265.
107. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
108. 329 U.S. 459 (1947).
109. Mata, 275 Neb. at 46-47, 745 N.W.2d at 265.
110. See supra subsection II.C.2.
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and the method-of-execution standards have a common origin. Estelle
v. GamblellL-the first case to employ the "deliberate indifference"
standard in a conditions-of-confinement claim-drew heavily on
Resweber in establishing the standard. In other words, the U.S. Su-
preme Court in Estelle relied on a method-of-execution case (i.e.
Resweber)-which the Court viewed as requiring subjective intent-in
order to establish the "deliberate indifference" standard. Further-
more, the Court in Estelle also situated its "deliberate indifference"
standard in the context of the "unnecessary and wanton" standard,
holding that "deliberate indifference to serious medical needs of pris-
oners constitutes the 'unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain' . . .
proscribed by the Eighth Amendment."112 The Estelle Court's reliance
on the "unnecessary and wanton" standard is significant because the
standard has its origin in method-of-execution cases, not conditions-
of-confinement cases. 113 Consequently, distinguishing conditions-of-
confinement claims from method-of-execution claims in order to argue
that the former, but not the latter, contain a subjective intent require-
ment, makes little sense. In fact, the U.S. Supreme Court's reliance
on method-of-execution jurisprudence in establishing a subjective in-
tent requirement in the conditions-of-confinement cases seems to fore-
close this argument.
The Nebraska Supreme Court additionally found that a subjective
intent analysis is inapplicable in method-of-execution claims because
Resweber dealt with a prison official who, like the prison officials in
the prison-conditions cases, was not imposing a punishment pursuant
to a statute. 114 However, the Court failed to recognize that the
Resweber Court did not find that either execution attempt violated the
Eighth Amendment. This is significant because the first attempt was
clearly authorized by the Louisiana method-of-execution statute. 115
While the U.S. Supreme Court's holding in Resweber explicitly ad-
dressed the constitutionality of the second execution attempt, the
Court clearly assumed that the first execution attempt-which acci-
dentally and unintentionally failed to result in death-did not violate
the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment.116 Commenting on its own analysis in Resweber, the Court
has stated, "Because the first attempt had been thwarted by an 'un-
foreseeable accident,' the officials lacked the culpable state of mind
necessary for the punishment to be regarded as 'cruel,' regardless of
111. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
112. Id. at 104 (citation omitted).
113. See infra subsection III.B.l.b.
114. Mata, 275 Neb. at 46, 745 N.W.2d at 265.
115. Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459, 461 (1947).
116. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463 ("We find nothing in what took place here [in either
execution attempt] which amounts to cruel and unusual punishment in the con-
stitutional sense.").
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the actual suffering inflicted."1 17 In other words, the first attempted
execution may have caused significant pain to the criminal, but the
Court did not find the execution attempt unconstitutional because the
pain resulted from an "unforeseeable accident," not from the cruel and
malicious intentions of prison officials. It is clear that the Court in
Resweber found both execution attempts constitutional. The Court's
finding that the first execution attempt was constitutional under-
mines the Nebraska Supreme Court's argument (which focused exclu-
sively on the second attempt) that a state-of-mind inquiry is only
relevant when a prison official carries out a punishment that is not
authorized by a statute. Such was the case in the second execution
attempt,118 but the first attempt was carried out pursuant to the Loui-
siana method-of-execution statute. 119
b. The Meaning of "Wanton" in Death Penalty Jurisprudence
Of the three Eighth Amendment standards identified by the Ne-
braska Supreme Court, the first standard-whether a method of exe-
cution subjects a prisoner to the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of
pain"12 O-strongly suggests a subjective intent requirement. This is
due to the fact that the term "wanton" typically connotes a state of
mind. 12 1 The court dealt with this suggestion of a subjective intent
requirement by arguing, "[W e do not believe 'wanton' in the context of
state sanctioned punishment implies a mental state."'122 Relying on
Resweber, the Court stated that "wanton" simply means that "the
method itself is inherently cruel." 123 The Court's rejection of the ordi-
nary meaning of wanton was an important and necessary move. In
order to legitimately maintain its argument that Eighth Amendment
method-of-execution jurisprudence does not contain a subjective in-
tent requirement, the Court necessarily had to deal with the state-of-
mind implied by the term "wanton." Redefining "wanton" was the
Court's way of dealing with this problem. As Chief Justice Heavican
observed in a separate opinion, "[Iln a subtle shift, the majority
dropped the words 'and wanton' from its standard so that it speaks
only to an unnecessary infliction of pain. The result is that a prisoner
117. Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (emphasis added) (citing Resweber, 329
U.S. at 464).
118. See Mata, 275 Neb. at 46, 745 N.W.2d at 265 ("[A]n inquiry into state of mind was
necessary in Resweber because the second attempt was outside what the statute
authorized.").
119. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 461.
120. See supra subsection II.C.2.
121. See, e.g., Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297 (interpreting the term "wanton" in the "unneces-
sary and wanton" standard as requiring a state of mind).
122. Mata, 275 Neb. at 46, 745 N.W.2d at 265.
123. Id., 745 N.W.2d at 265 (citing Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947) (four-
justice plurality opinion)).
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need not show any culpability on the part of the government to invali-
date a method of execution."
124
The Court's assertion that "wanton" does not imply a mental state
is questionable for a number of reasons. First, irrespective of context,
"wanton" invariably connotes a state of mind. Black's Law Dictionary,
for example, defines wanton as "[uinreasonably or maliciously risking
harm while being utterly indifferent to the consequences." 12 5 In addi-
tion, the entry for wanton states that in the context of criminal law,
the term "connotes malice (in the criminal-law sense)." 126 Malice in
turn is simply defined as "[t]he intent, without justification or excuse,
to commit a wrongful act."12 7 Thus, under virtually any definition of
"wanton," the term connotes a subjective state of mind.
Second, the term "wanton," in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence,
is invariably paired with the term "unnecessary" in the context of the
standard defining cruel and unusual punishment as the "unnecessary
and wanton infliction of pain."128 The fact that the Court has repeat-
edly included the term "wanton" in its articulation of this standard
suggests that the term is not superfluous, but rather that the term
retains an independent and essential meaning separate from "unnec-
essary."12 9 As Chief Justice Heavican pointed out in his dissent,
"[W]hen used independently, the word 'unnecessary' creates 'too much
leeway for a court to declare one method of execution unconstitutional
merely because it found another was better."'1 3o In other words, the
terms "wanton" and "unnecessary" carry separate meanings, and each
meaning is an important and indispensable element of the overall
standard. By collapsing "wanton" into "unnecessary," the Court dis-
torted the original standard articulated by the U.S. Supreme Court,
creating a new variation of the standard that is problematic because,
as Chief Justice Heavican pointed out, it gives courts almost limitless
latitude to find a method of execution unconstitutional.
Third, the Court relied on Resweber in claiming that "[i] n a method
of execution challenge, 'wanton' means that the method itself is inher-
124. Id. at 76, 745 N.W.2d at 284.
125. BLAC's LAw DICTIONARY 1613-14 (8th ed. 2004).
126. Id.
127. Id. at 976.
128. See, e.g., Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153
(1976); Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
129. See, e.g., State v. Hamik, 262 Neb. 761, 769-70, 635 N.W.2d 123, 130 (2001) ("In
construing a statute, a court must attempt to give effect to all of its parts, and if it
can be avoided, no word, clause, or sentence will be rejected as superfluous or
meaningless; it is not within the province of the court to read anything plain,
direct, and unambiguous out of the statute.").
130. State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1, 78, 745 N.W.2d 229, 285 (2008) (Heavican, C.J., dis-
senting) (quoting Brief for Criminal Justice Legal Foundation as Amicus Curiae
Supporting Respondents at 17, Baze v. Rees, 2007 WL 2781088 (U.S. July 11,
2007) (No. 07-5439)).
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ently cruel,"131 yet a review of Resweber does not support the court's
assertion. At issue here is whether the word "wanton," as a legal term
of art, implies a mental state. The U.S. Supreme Court in Resweber
mentions the term "wanton" only once, stating simply that the
"[p]rohibition against the wanton infliction of pain has come into our
law from the Bill of Rights of 1688."132 The context in which the one
instance of the term "wanton" appears in Resweber does not support
the court's assertion that wanton does not imply a mental state.
Finally, the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" standard
can be traced back to Wilkerson and Resweber-cases in which the
U.S. Supreme Court strongly suggested that a subjective-intent in-
quiry is an important component of a method-of-execution analysis.13 3
In articulating the baseline standard for defining cruel and unusual
punishment, the Wilkerson Court included an observation that the
Eighth Amendment prohibits "unnecessary cruelty." 13 4 Likewise, the
Court in Resweber stated that the Eighth Amendment prohibits "the
infliction of unnecessary pain."135 In Furman v. Georgia,136 the Court
reiterated the Wilkerson and Resweber standard, but added the term
"wanton," noting that the context of Resweber clearly indicated that
"the Court was disapproving the wanton infliction of physical pain."13 7
Four years later, in Gregg v. Georgia,13 s the Court articulated the fi-
nal iteration of the standard quoted by the Nebraska Supreme Court.
Relying on Furman and Wilkerson, the Court stated that in order to
comport with the Eighth Amendment, a punishment "must not in-
volve the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain."139 Thus, an ex-
amination of the "unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain" standard
reveals that the standard has its origins in method-of-execution cases
that endorsed a subjective-intent inquiry. Consequently, the term
"wanton," as employed in this standard, is arguably intended to con-
vey a sense of subjective intent.
c. The U.S. Supreme Court Method-of-Execution
Jurisprudence and Subjective Intent
After arguing that the term "wanton," as employed in death pen-
alty cases, does not imply a mental state, the Mata Court then cited
131. Id. at 46, 745 N.W. at 265 (citing Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)).
132. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463. The Court here refers to the English Bill of Rights, a
foundational act of British Parliament which included, among other things, a pro-
hibition against cruel and unusual punishment.
133. See infra subsection III.B.l.c.
134. Wilkerson v. State of Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878). See also supra section H.A.
135. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 464. See also supra section II.A.
136. 408 U.S. 238 (1972).
137. Id. at 392-93 (Burger, C.J., dissenting).
138. 428 U.S. 153 (1976).
139. Id. at 173.
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Trop v. Dulles140 as evidence that "legislative intent to inflict cruel
and unusual punishment is not a relevant consideration in a method-
of-punishment challenge."141 In Trop, the U.S. Supreme Court struck
down a statute sanctioning wartime deserters with a forfeiture of citi-
zenship, holding that this punishment constituted cruel and unusual
punishment.142 The Mata Court correctly pointed out that the U.S.
Supreme Court "was unconcerned whether Congress intended to in-
flict cruel and unusual punishment."14
3
It must be pointed out, however, that Trop is not a death penalty
case, much less a method-of-execution case. In determining whether
U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence indicates that a state of mind in-
quiry is relevant to a method-of-execution challenge, the Mata Court
should have looked to the most applicable cases-namely those involv-
ing method of execution-not a case dealing with a wartime desertion
statute. And, in fact, the Court did cite Resweber, noting that "four
justices in Resweber concluded that state officials' lack of intent to
cause pain was irrelevant."144 It is in fact true that four justices in
Resweber maintained that subjective intent is irrelevant to an Eighth
Amendment method-of-execution analysis. What the Court fails to
mention, however, is that those four justices were the dissenting jus-
tices in Resweber.
The four justice plurality writing the majority opinion in Resweber
adopted a different position. In at least two instances, the Court con-
sidered the state of mind of the prison officials who carried out the
first execution attempt (which failed) and the second, successful at-
tempt. The Court noted that the failed attempt was "an accident, with
no suggestion of malevolence."'145 The Court concluded that executing
a prisoner after a failed execution attempt does not constitute cruel
and unusual punishment within the meaning of the Eighth Amend-
ment, reasoning that "[t]here [was] no purpose to inflict unnecessary
pain nor any unnecessary pain involved in the proposed execution."14 6
Admittedly, the breadth of the Court's holding is somewhat unclear.
A narrow reading of Resweber would arguably suggest that the Court's
analysis-including the Court's state-of-mind inquiry-is applicable
only to those rare and idiosyncratic cases involving a failed execution
attempt. A broad reading of Resweber, on the other hand, suggests
140. 356 U.S. 86 (1958).
141. State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1, 47, 745 N.W.2d 229, 266 (2008).
142. Id., 745 N.W.2d at 266.
143. Id., 745 N.W.2d at 266.
144. Id., 745 N.W.2d at 266 (citing Francis v. Resweber, 329 U.S. 459 (1947)). In the
Resweber dissent, Justice Burton wrote, "Lack of intent that the first application
be less than fatal is not material. The intent of the executioner cannot lessen the
torture or excuse the result." Resweber, 329 U.S. at 477.
145. Resweber, 329 U.S. at 463.
146. Id. at 464.
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that the Court's analysis is applicable to all method-of-execution
cases, not just those involving a failed execution attempt. Arguably, a
broad reading of Resweber is preferable, since the Court in Resweber
did not find anything constitutionally amiss with either the first or the
second execution attempt. 14 7 The Court simply assumed the constitu-
tionality of the first attempt and focused on the second attempt. The
fact that the Court upheld the second attempt as well suggests a stan-
dard susceptible to broad application.
While the applicability of the Court's analysis in Resweber is ar-
guably unclear, the other method-of-execution cases lend significant
support to the argument that a state-of-mind inquiry is relevant to a
method-of-execution challenge. The Court in Kemmler, for example,
emphasized the benevolent intentions of the New York legislators who
enacted the statute authorizing the electric chair as a newfound
method of execution. In reviewing the decisions of the New York state
courts below, the Court observed, "The determination of the legisla-
ture that the use of electricity as an agency for producing death consti-
tuted a more humane method of executing the judgment of the court
in capital cases was held conclusive."148 The Court then discussed at
length the impetus behind the enactment of the New York electric
chair statute, noting that the governor of New York-who apparently
was dissatisfied with the current method of execution (hanging)-had
encouraged the legislature to devise and enact into law a more hu-
mane method of execution. 149 The Court quoted from the governor's
address to the New York legislature:
The present mode of executing criminals by hanging has come down to us
from the dark ages, and it may well be questioned whether the science of the
present day cannot provide a means for taking the life of such as are con-
demned to die in a less barbarous manner. I commend this suggestion to the
consideration of the legislature.
1 50
The legislature responded to the governor's invitation by forming a
commission to investigate electrocution as a method of execution. The
Court noted, "The legislature accordingly appointed a commission to
investigate and report 'the most humane and practical method known
to modern science of carrying into effect the sentence of death in capi-
tal cases."' 15 1
The other seminal method-of-execution case, Wilkerson v. Utah,
did not explicitly incorporate a state-of-mind inquiry into its analysis
the way that Resweber and Kemmler did, but it certainly implied a
subjective intent requirement in the Eighth Amendment.
147. See supra subsection III.B.l.a.
148. In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 443 (1890).
149. Id. at 444.
150. Id. (quoting the New York governor).
151. Id. (quoting the New York governor).
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In the early method-of-execution cases, the Court was clearly con-
cerned with subjective intent. For the Court, the intent of a legisla-
ture enacting a method-of-execution statute-or of prison officials
carrying out an execution-was a relevant determination in deciding
whether a particular method of execution violated the Eighth Amend-
ment's prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment. Recently,
Justice Thomas emphasized this point in his concurring opinion in
Baze v. Rees,15 2 where he observed:
Quite plainly, what defined these punishments was that they were designed
to inflict torture as a way of enhancing a death sentence; they were intended
to produce a penalty worse than death, to accomplish something "more than
the mere extinguishment of life." The evil the Eighth Amendment targets is
intentional infliction of gratuitous pain, and that is the standard our method-
of-execution cases have explicitly or implicitly invoked.153
Of course, the Mata Court could have distinguished between the
U.S. Constitution and the Nebraska Constitution. It could have ac-
knowledged a subjective intent requirement under the federal consti-
tution and rejected that requirement, holding that the Nebraska
Constitution, unlike the federal Constitution, contains no such re-
quirement. Instead, the court relied on a necessarily strained reading
of federal precedent in its analysis.
2. The Court Could Have Reached the Same Result by Finding
a Subjective Intent Requirement
As the Nebraska Supreme Court correctly pointed out, early U.S.
Supreme Court decisions (and many subsequent lower court decisions)
upholding electrocution as a method of execution relied on the incor-
rect assumption that death by the electric chair is instantaneous.
154
But while the factual assumptions of early cases like Kemmler and
Resweber may have turned out to be spurious, the general method-of-
execution standard articulated in those early cases-i.e., whether a
method of execution causes the "wanton and unnecessary infliction of
pain"-is still valid.
Arguably, the Nebraska Supreme Court could have applied the
"unnecessary and wanton" standard without jettisoning or redefining
the term "wanton"-thus preserving an implicit subjective intent re-
quirement-and reached the same result. Acknowledging a subjective
intent requirement in the method-of-execution line of cases would not
have precluded the Court from holding that death by electrocution vio-
152. 128 S.Ct. 1520 (2008). In Baze v. Rees, the Court recently rejected a challenge to
the Kentucky Department of Corrections lethal injection protocol. The petition-
ers alleged, not that lethal injection is per se unconstitutional, but that the Ken-
tucky Department of Corrections lethal injection protocol subjected inmates to an
unacceptable risk of significant pain. Id. at 1526.
153. Id. at 1560.
154. See State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1, 56-57, 745 N.W.2d 229, 272 (2008).
25720091
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
lates the Nebraska Constitution's prohibition against cruel and unu-
sual punishment.
As the Court observed, modern science provides a more complete
understanding of the pain and suffering experienced by those who suf-
fer death by electrocution than was available when the U.S. Supreme
court decided Kemmler over a century ago. 155 Even though seminal
death-by-electrocution decisions such as Kemmler and Resweber may
have relied on the incorrect factual assumption that death by electro-
cution is instantaneous and painless, the standards articulated in
those decisions are still relevant and valid. Underlying those stan-
dards is a clear requirement of subjective intent. Nevertheless, in its
analysis, the Court rejected a subjective intent requirement-a move
that was not only contrary to U.S. Supreme Court jurisprudence, but
also unnecessary.
The Court could have found a subjective intent requirement and
still reached the same result. The emergence of current scientific
knowledge vis-A-vis the electric chair and its effect on human physiol-
ogy creates the requisite subjective intent. The Court concluded that
"the evidence here shows that electrocution inflicts intense pain and
agonizing suffering."156 To know that a method of execution causes
pain and suffering, and to execute people in that manner despite this
knowledge, is to deliberately, wantonly, and unnecessarily inflict pain
and suffering on a criminal.157 If state legislatures and prison offi-
cials now know, in the light of contemporary science, that the electric
chair causes intense pain and suffering, then going forward with ex-
ecutions anyway may amount to cruel and unusual punishment.
3. Implications of the Court's Holding
The Court's decision, while imbued with good intentions, raises a
number of difficult policy concerns. For example, the Court's rejection
of a subjective intent requirement raises concerns about the difficulty
of applying a standard that does not include a state-of-mind inquiry.
Such an approach would render unconstitutional good faith accidents
and mistakes like that which occurred in Resweber. Such an approach
might also place an administratively onerous burden on prison offi-
cials, who would be forced to consider the idiosyncratic and unique
physical characteristics of death row inmates. Different inmates may
react differently to a particular method of execution. If a particular
155. Id. at 38, 745 N.W.2d at 260.
156. Id. at 66, 745 N.W.2d at 278.
157. In other Eighth Amendment contexts, the U.S. Supreme Court has imputed in-
tent where prison officials know (or should know) that a particular policy or
course of action poses a significant danger to inmates, but disregard that known
risk and proceed with the policy or course of action anyway. See, e.g., Estelle v.
Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 105-06 (1976).
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method of execution is particularly painful for one individual but not
for others, is the method of execution unconstitutional as to the one
inmate but not the others? Should the state be required to perform
elaborate investigations to discover how a particular inmate will re-
spond to a method of execution?
Furthermore, the Court's dismissal of a subjective intent require-
ment runs contrary to established U.S. Supreme Court precedent, as
well as established Constitutional law and U.S. criminal law princi-
ples. Suppose, for example, that a vindictive and retributive state leg-
islature decided to devise and enact a method of execution intended to
cause excruciating pain and suffering on a criminal before killing him.
Thus, the intent of the legislature is clearly and unapologetically to
torture a criminal to death, as retributive payback for whatever hei-
nous crime the criminal may have committed. Assume, furthermore,
that the prison officials carrying out this particular method of execu-
tion are on board with the legislature's clear intent to torture death
row criminals to death. However, let us also assume under this hypo-
thetical that the method of execution has the unintended effect of ac-
tually killing criminals instantaneously. Would the method of
execution therefore be constitutional? Arguably, according to the
Court's ruling in Mata, the method of execution might pass Constitu-
tional muster because it does not subject the criminal to unnecessary
pain and suffering.158
Our criminal law's emphasis on mens rea is founded on the princi-
ple that culpability is found only where an actor acts with a culpable
state of mind. In discussing mens rea with respect to state actors in
Eighth Amendment claims, a distinction of course must be drawn be-
tween the mental state of government officials and that of criminals.
Nevertheless, the U.S. Supreme Court has observed that mens rea
concepts may be imported from criminal law to analyze the mental
state of prison officials in Eighth Amendment cases:
To be sure, the reasons for focusing on what a defendant's mental attitude
actually was (or is), rather than what it should have been (or should be), differ
in the Eighth Amendment context from that of the criminal law. Here, a sub-
jective approach isolates those who inflict punishment; there, it isolates those
against whom punishment should be inflicted. But the result is the same: to
act recklessly in either setting a person must "consciously disregar[d]" a sub-
stantial risk of serious harm.
1 5 9
The Nebraska Supreme Court's rejection of a subjective intent re-
quirement holds the Nebraska legislature and Nebraska prison offi-
cials to a standard that conceptually is the equivalent of strict
158. Of course, the method of execution might still fail to comport with the "evolving
standards of decency" and "dignity of man" standards. However, the hypothetical
is framed in terms that illustrate the potential ramifications of the Court's rejec-
tion of a subjective intent requirement.
159. Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 839 (1994) (citation omitted).
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liability.16o And the U.S. Supreme Court has never rejected a subjec-
tive intent requirement in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. Quite
the contrary, the Court has always engaged in a state-of-mind inquiry
in its Eighth Amendment analysis. 1 6 1 In sum, the Court's decision
runs counter to traditional death penalty jurisprudence in addition to
well-established principles of criminal law.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Court made clear in Mata that it does not consider a state-of-
mind inquiry to be relevant to a method-of-execution challenge. As
the Nebraska legislature has recently passed a new statute authoriz-
ing lethal injection as a method of execution, it would have been wise
to carefully consider the Court's holding. It is now not enough for the
legislature to demonstrate benevolent intentions in drafting and en-
acting the statute. If the legislature enacted a method-of-execution
statute with the intention of creating a more humane means of execu-
tion, the statute may nevertheless not pass constitutional muster if it
is procedurally flawed in a way that subjects an inmate to a signifi-
cant risk of pain and suffering. The Court will not consider the benign
intentions of the legislature enacting the statute, nor will it consider
the state of mind of the prison officials who develop the lethal injection
protocol and carry out lethal injection executions. In the end, the en-
actment of a lethal injection statute will no doubt result in a more
humane method of execution. The Nebraska Supreme Court was
likely correct when it concluded that "'[electrocution] has proven itself
to be a dinosaur more befitting the laboratory of Baron Frankenstein
than the death chamber' of state prisons."162 Nevertheless, the Court
rejected well-established U.S. Supreme Court precedents in arriving
at what was arguably a correct outcome. In the end, for the Nebraska
Supreme Court, the ends justified the means.
Mark Mills
160. Strict liability is indeed rare in criminal law, as legislatures are loath to impose
strict liability. Driving a vehicle in excess of the speed limit, to take a familiar
example, is a strict liability crime for which no mens rea is required.
161. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 297 (1991) (stating that an Eighth
Amendment challenge must establish a "sufficiently culpable state of mind").
162. State v. Mata, 275 Neb. 1, 67, 745 N.W.2d 229, 278 (2008) (quoting Jones v. State,
701 So. 2d 76, 87 (Fla. 1997) (Shaw, J., dissenting)).
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